Interactivity, Fictionality, and Incompleteness by Wildman, Nathan & Woodward, Richard
Interactivity, Fictionality, and Incompleteness.  
Nathan Wildman and Richard Woodward 
 
At the end of Hidetaka Miyazaki’s masterpiece Dark Souls, the player is faced with a 
choice: to link the flame and let the cycle continue, prolonging the Age of Fire, or to 
walk away and let the world fade to ash, ushering in the Age of Dark. This 
represents the culmination of a long and difficult journey that involves many other 
choices: where to go and in what order, who to kill and who to spare, and so on and 
so forth. Though many elements of the journey are fixed for all who battle to the end 
— the Bells of Awakening must be rung, for example — much is left up to the 
player.  
 Dark Souls, like most videogames, is plausibly classified as a work of fiction.1 
This is reflected in the ease by which we apply to it the concept of fictionality, the 
concept of something being true “in” or “according to” a representational work.2 
Even setting aside that the story of Dark Souls is opaque and open to interpretation, 
certain things are undoubtably true ‘in the world of the story’: for instance, it is true 
in Dark Souls that there are two Bells of Awakening (rather than twelve), that 
something (rather than nothing) happens when both Bells are rung, and that the fire 
is fading (rather than burning bright). Indeed, part of the richness of Dark Souls lies 
in the novel ways in which the fictional goings-on are indicated in indirect and 
subtle ways, via item descriptions, character design, and environmental clues, as 
opposed to the more direct methods often employed in other videogames.  
Unlike more familiar works of literary fiction, however, there is something 
importantly interactive about Dark Souls. In part, this is because there seems to an 
important sense in which much of the story is, in one way or another, in the hands of 
the player. For instance, if the player enters the Painted World, they can choose 
whether to slay or spare Priscilla, and the player’s choice seems to play a significant 
and essential role in shaping the content of the story itself: players who spare 
Priscilla make it fictional that she is spared, those who slay her make it fictional that she 
is slain. Put otherwise, Dark Souls leaves certain aspects of the story open, and it is up 
to the player to decide which path is taken, and hence what is fictionalized. This 
feature is further underscored by an important difference between the reasons why 
players repeatedly play through Dark Souls and why readers reread His Dark 
Materials. In both cases, our repeat engagement can be motivated by a desire to see 
what we have missed. But in the case of Dark Souls, our repeat engagement seems to 
                                                 
1 Aarseth (2007) contends that videogames are virtual, rather than fictional. However, there is no 
obvious incompatibility between Aarseth’s notion of virtuality and the notion of fictionality 
employed here. 
2 For an overview of the literature on fictionality, see Woodward (2011, 2014). We associate the idea 
that fictionality is distinctive of fiction with Walton (1990). For further discussion of the distinction 
between fiction and nonfiction, see Friend (2011), Stock (2011), Matravers (2014), and Davies (2015). 
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be motivated by a desire to see how things can turn out differently if other choices 
are made (or to see how different choices ultimately deliver the same results). 
 We think these appearances are not deceptive: Dark Souls, like most 
videogames, can be rightly classified as an interactive fiction.3 That is, there is an 
important sense in which videogames like Dark Souls are interactive in ways that 
fictions from more traditional media are not. And one important aspect of this 
contrast arises out of the special role that players have in determining what is and 
what is not fictional.  
 The relevant notion of interactivity is unclear, however, standing in need of 
explication. And this lack of clarity isn’t just a problem for understanding 
videogames. As the category of works of fiction can intuitively be taken as 
subcategory of the category of works of art, it is natural to think that the category of 
works of interactive fiction can be taken as a subcategory of the category of works of 
interactive art. But, despite the hype surrounding so-called interactive art, there is a 
mundane sense in which all artworks are interactive, since engagement and 
appreciation obviously require audience participation, from sheer attention to a 
subtler awareness of the contexts in which the relevant artwork was created and 
appreciated. To the extent that the label “interactive art” is not merely a buzzword, 
the idea must be that some (but only some) artworks have certain distinctive 
features the presence of which license the application of a more specific concept of 
interactivity not present in more traditional artworks. The question, then, is what 
those features that characterize the salient concept of interactivity are.  
Dominic McIver Lopes (2001, 2010) offers a convenient starting point for 
addressing this question. Central to Lopes’s proposal is a distinction between the 
structure of our experience of an artwork and the structure of that artwork itself. For 
instance, the structure of The White Album – that is, the intrinsic or representational 
features of the work ‘’the appreciation of which are necessary for engagement with 
it’’ (2001, p. 68) – is not altered by shuffling the tracks. Similarly, the narrative 
structure of Noé’s Irréversible, in which the order of narrated events differs from their 
chronological order, is not altered by the possibility of using a DVD to watch the 
chapters chronologically. In both cases, our experiences may vary depending on how 
we choose to engage with the target work, but the work itself remains unchanged.  
With this in mind, Lopes distinguishes between weakly and strongly 
interactive works. According to him, a work is weakly interactive just in case 
appreciators of that work are in control of the order in which its content is presented 
to them. It should be clear that many, if not all, artworks turn out to be weakly 
interactive in this sense: we can read the chapters of 1984, or listen to the tracks that 
                                                 
3 In treating (most) videogames as interactive fictions, we follow e.g. Tavinor (2005, 2008, 2009), 
Robson and Meskin (2012, 2016), Meskin and Robson (2010, 2012) and Cova and Garcia (2015). The 
‘most’ qualifier is necessary because plausibly some videogames – e.g. Tetris, Chessmaster, and Puzzle 
Bobble – are not fictions in the ordinary sense of the term, though they may be fictions in Walton’s 
sense (see Walton 1990). 
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make up The White Album, in any order we want, and even paintings like Guernica 
seem weakly interactive insofar as we have control over which part of the painting 
we examine first. But in these cases, the content of the work seems independent from 
the order in which we access it: though we have control over how we engage with 
the work, our choices have no effect on the nature of the work itself.  
This marks the key feature of strongly interactive works: their content is 
‘‘partially determined by the interactor’s actions’’ (2001, p. 68). That is, the choices 
one makes when engaging with a strongly interactive work helps shape the very 
content of the work. Moreover, not only is the structure of a strongly interactive 
artwork shaped in part by the appreciators choices, but fully appreciating such an 
artwork also requires appreciating that the work is so-interactive (ibid, p.77). So 
whilst weakly interactive artworks may be malleable with respect to how we engage 
with their representational content, strongly interactive artworks are malleable in a 
more significant way.  
 Though some have qualms about its extensional adequacy, Lopes’ proposal 
provides a highly suggestive model for understanding interactive fictions.4 Insofar 
as the structural properties of an interactive artwork are somehow determined by the 
choices of those appreciating that work, it is natural to think that interactive fictions 
are those fictions where the choices of appreciators play a constitutive role in 
determining what fictional, i.e. true according to that work. At the very least, the 
conception of interactivity wherein appreciators play a constitutive role in shaping 
what is fictional in ways beyond what is found in more traditional fictions is 
deserving of serious attention, apparently applicable with respect to videogames like 
Dark Souls, and dovetails with the wider discussion of the more general nature of 
interactive art. 5  In this sense, it provides a plausible starting point for future 
exploration of the concept. What remains to be seen is whether the notion of 
interactivity can be further explicated in a way that coheres with our understanding 
of fictionality itself. 
We believe that the key to doing so involves carefully distinguishing various 
ways in which fictions can ‘leave things open’. For just as there seems to be a 
mundane sense in which all artworks are (weakly) interactive, there also seems to 
also be a rather mundane sense in which all fictions ‘leave things open’, since fictions 
seem to be essentially incomplete insofar as there are always questions about the 
fictional goings-on that are left open and unresolved.6 Properly understanding the 
contrast between interactive fictions like Dark Souls and non-interactive fictions like 
His Dark Materials, we will argue, involves the recognition of a particular kind of 
fictional incompleteness that is present in the former but not the later. The resulting 
                                                 
4 See Smuts (2009) and Preston (2014). 
5 See e.g. Tavinor (2005, 2008, 2009), Robson and Meskin (2012, 2016, 2017), and Patridge (2017) for 
similar thoughts. 




characterisation of interactivity via this specific type of fictional incompleteness will 
be useful not only to those who are interested in the nature and aesthetics of 
videogames, but also to those who interested in the more general notion of 
interactive art. 
 
1. Walton on Fictionality 
 
Though there is considerable debate about how the concept of fictionality should be 
understood, the dominant approach that can be found in the contemporary literature 
is due to the pioneering work of Kendall Walton in his Mimesis as Make-Believe.7 
According to Walton, the key to understanding fictionality is to recognise that our 
engagement with fictions is both inherently imaginative and inherently structured.  
 That imagination plays a role in our engagement with fiction should not be 
surprising: Walton describes the idea as akin to pulling a rabbit out of a hutch. When 
we read a story like Harry Potter, we respond by imagining certain things: that there 
are wizards and witches, that there is a school called ‘Hogwart’s’, that one young 
wizard who attends that school is called ‘Harry’ and so on. But, as Walton notes, our 
imaginative responses to a fiction are not chaotic: they are shaped by the objective 
features of the work in question (and perhaps wider features of the context of 
creation/appreciation). Thus central to his proposal is an analogy between truth and 
belief on the one hand, and fictionality and imagining on the other:  
 
Imagining is easily thought of as a free, unregulated activity, subject to no 
constraints save whim, happenstance, and the obscure demands of the 
unconscious. In this respect, imagination appears to contrast sharply with 
belief. Beliefs, unlike imaginings, are correct or incorrect. Belief aims at 
truth. What is true and only what is true is to be believed. We are not free 
to believe as we please. We are free to imagine as we please. So it may 
seem, but it isn’t quite so. Imaginings are constrained also; some are 
proper, appropriate in certain contexts, and others not. (1990, p.39) 
 
So, for instance, just as we form beliefs with the goal of getting the world right, our 
imaginings are goal-directed too: loosely put, when we imagine things on the basis 
of engaging with a work of fiction, we want our imaginings to get its associated 
‘fictional world’ right. Hence, just as there are tigers is the thing to believe in a context 
where there are tigers, there are witches is the thing to imagine in a context where one 
is reading a story in which it is fictional that there are such things.  
 However, in disanalogy to the case of belief, where it is natural to think that 
the question of whether p is to be believed is fixed downstream of the question of 
whether or not p is true — i.e. to the extent that one ought to believe that there are 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed outline of Walton’s account of fictionality, see Woodward (2014).  
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tigers, that’s because it is true that there are tigers — Walton thinks that fictionality 
can be analysed in terms of its normative role via the following definition:  
 
What it is for p to be fictional just is for there to be a prescription to imagine 
that p8 
 
Properly understanding this definition requires treading carefully. For one, the 
relevant claims of fictionality are work-relative: the proposition that there are witches 
is fictional with respect to Harry Potter but not to 1984, for instance. Hence the idea is 
that the fictionality of p with respect to a work w is tied to the existence of a 
prescription to imagine p when one engages with w, and to the extent that the 
features of w generate the prescription to imagine p, we might say that p is w-
fictional just in case w prescribes imagining p.  
Similarly, the relevant prescriptions are also goal-relative: if one engages with 
Harry Potter merely with the goal of examining J.K. Rowling’s use of personal 
pronouns, there is no requirement that one imagines that there are witches since one 
is not engaging in a way connected to appreciating the work as a work of fiction. 
Thus the fictionality of p with respect to a work w is tied to the existence of a 
prescription to imagine p when one engages with w with the goal of fully 
appreciating that work. 
 Finally, it is important to note that the target concept of fictionality is 
operative with respect to questions of what is true according to a given work. That 
might sound trivial, but its importance emerges once it is remembered that there is 
another concept of fictionality that plays an important role in Walton’s account, 
connected not to what is true according to a given work but rather to questions of 
what is true according to a game of make-believe. And, as we shall see in §4, tracing the 
connection between these two concepts will have a special significance for our 
discussion about the nature of interactive fictions.  
 
2. Fictional Incompleteness and Prescriptions (not) to Imagine  
 
Walton’s account specifies not only the conditions under which a given proposition 
is fictional, but also the conditions under which a given proposition is not fictional: it 
is not the case that p is fictional just in case there is no prescription to imagine that p. 
The phenomenon of fictional incompleteness thus emerges in cases where there is a gap 
in the imaginings prescribed by a work. To illustrate, consider a case in which a 
work is silent over some detail about a given character, such as the colour of that 
character’s eyes. Such incompleteness is tied to the fact that it is neither fictional that 
                                                 
8 Walton (2015) has distances himself from this proposal, and now takes prescriptions to imagine to 
be necessary but not sufficient for fictionality. See Woodward (2014, 2016) for a defence of the original 
proposal.   
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the character has blue eyes, nor fictional that the character has green eyes, nor 
fictional that the character has brown eyes, and so on. But neither is it fictional that 
the character does not have blue eyes, nor fictional that the character does not have 
green eyes, nor fictional that the character does not have brown eyes, and so on. In 
each case, Walton’s explanation is that there is a gap in the imaginings prescribed by 
the work. Hence the picture is one where a fiction is incomplete with respect to a 
given proposition p just in case neither p nor not-p are fictional – which, for Walton, 
is explained in terms of there being neither a prescription to imagine p nor a 
prescription to imagine not-p. (Note that in such cases the disjunction p or not-p may 
still be fictional, even though neither disjunct is.)  
 However, there is an important structural mismatch between the way we 
normally think about fictionality and the Waltonian account in terms of 
prescriptions to imagine.9 Fictionality is typically regimented in terms of fictional 
operators such as “it is fictional that”, where the relativization to a work is left 
implicit, and “According to Harry Potter”, where it is made explicit. However, when 
we consider how such operators interact with negation, it is clear that there are only 
three options: negation can take wide scope, as in “it is not fictional that p”, narrow 
scope, as in “it is fictional that not-p”, or both, as in “it is not fictional that not-p”. All 
three cases are accommodated on Walton’s account: the wide scope case emerges 
when there is no prescription to imagine p, the narrow scope case when there is a 
prescription to imagine not-p, and the both scope case when there is no prescription 
to imagine not-p.  
 But there is a further way negation can interact with prescriptions to imagine 
that has no obvious regimentation in terms of fictional operators, emerging 
whenever there is a prescription not to imagine p. Such prescriptions are different 
from the three cases considered above. That there is no prescription to imagine p 
does not entail that there is a prescription not to imagine p, since the work may 
permit imagining p even though it does not mandate doing so. For example, in Harry 
Potter, there is no prescription to imagine that Ron has an even number of freckles, 
but there is nothing preventing us from imagining that this is so: appreciators are 
permitted but not prescribed to imagine that Ron’s freckles are evenly numbered. 
And that there is a prescription to imagine not-p does not entail that there is a 
prescription not to imagine p, since the work may be inconsistent, mandating 
imagining both p and not-p. Finally, that there is no prescription to imagine not-p 
does not entail that there is a prescription not to imagine p since one reason why a 
work may not prescribe imagining not-p is because it rather prescribes imagining p. 
For instance, the reason why it would be a mistake to imagine that Hermione is not a 
witch is precisely because she is one. 
 These observations help to clarify the notion of fictional incompleteness. For 
even if the general specification of fictional incompleteness is given in terms of it 
                                                 
9 The following observations are explored in more detail in Williams and Woodward (ms).  
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neither being fictional that p nor fictional that not-p, and even if that condition 
obtains whenever there is neither a prescription to imagine p nor a prescription to 
imagine not-p, there are (at least) two very different species of fictional 
incompleteness that can be a distinguished. On the one hand, we have cases where 
there is not only no prescription to imagine p and no prescription to imagine not-p, 
but also no prescription not to imagine p and no prescription not to imagine not-p. 
Put otherwise, in such cases, imagining p and imagining not-p are both permitted, 
though neither is prescribed. (We assume, in line with the standard literature on 
deontic modals, that permission is the dual of obligation.) On the other hand, there 
will be cases where there is no prescription to imagine p and no prescription to 
imagine not-p, though there is also a prescription not to imagine p and a prescription 
not to imagine not-p. In these cases, imagining p and imagining not-p are not merely 
not required, but in fact prohibited. Accordingly, call the former cases of permissive 
incompleteness, and the latter cases of prohibitive incompleteness.  
 Standard instances of fictional incompleteness, which arise due to fictions 
being silent over details inessential to appreciating the work, are naturally classified 
as permissive cases. Imaging Ron as having an even number of freckles even though 
the work is itself silent over the matter seems acceptable; in Walton’s terminology, 
such imaginings are authorised by Harry Potter, even though the imaginings have 
gone beyond what are, strictly speaking, prescribed by the work.  
However, there are cases which more plausible fit the prohibitive model. 
Consider the question of whether Bladerunner’s Rick Deckhard is a human being or a 
non-human replicant. Unlike a “don’t care” question (e.g., does he have an even 
number of freckles?), whether Deckhard is a human or replicant lies at the very heart 
of the film, such that fully appreciating Bladerunner may be thought to require being 
in a state of imaginative uncertainty about his true nature, to suspend making an 
imaginative judgement one way or the other. Put otherwise, fully embracing the 
ambiguity of Bladerunner involves playing a game of make believe which does not 
settle whether or not Deckhard is human.10  
Finally, recall that Walton’s starting point for building his account is the 
analogy between the link between belief and truth on the one hand and between 
imagining and fictionality on the other. That analogy is again suggestive: if there is a 
gap in what is true (perhaps due to vagueness or the openness of the future, say) we 
should not conclude that it is always permissible to believe whatever we wish; in 
                                                 
10 Our take on the Bladerunner case is, admittedly, controversial: whereas its director, Ridley Scott, has 
said that Deckhard is an replicant, Philip K. Dick, the author of the story of which it is based, has said 
that Deckhard is human (and this is how Harrison Ford said he played Deckard in Bladerunner). And 
there is also a tricky question of how our interpretation of Bladerunner will be effected when its 
upcoming sequel is released. For our part, we do not think that the beliefs of fiction makers decisively 
settle questions of what is true according to the work’s they create: considerations of aesthetic charity 
also play an important role. And Bladerunner is better if interpreted along the lines we have described. 
For more on the factors relevant to the determination of fictionality, see Woodward (2014, pp.832-5).  
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such cases we are required to suspend belief. Similarly, if there is a gap in what is 
fictional, we should not conclude that it is always permissible to imagine whatever 
we wish; in some cases, we should suspend imaginative judgement. 
 Now, recall that one of our central goals is to make sense of the idea that 
interactive fictions are distinctive insofar as the choices of appreciators play a 
constitutive role in determining what is and what is not true in the story in ways that 
go beyond what is found in more traditional, non-interactive works. Our previous 
discussion of fictional incompleteness is an important step insofar as it gives precise 
content to the thought that fictions leave things open. That is, to say that a fiction 
leaves it open whether p (e.g. that Harry Potter leaves it open whether Harry’s blood 
type is A+, or that Blade Runner leave it open whether Deckhard is a replicant) is to 
say that it is not the case that p is fictional but also that it is not the case that not-p is 
fictional (e.g. that it is neither fictionally true nor fictionally false that Harry’s blood 
type is A+, and neither fictionally true nor fictionally false that Deckhard is a 
replicant). This general characterisation of fictional incompleteness, moreover, 
allows for two more specific cases within the context of Walton’s conception of 
fictionality: the case where appreciators are permitted to respond to a case of 
fictional incompleteness by imagining what they want, and the case where 
appreciators are not permitted to respond by imagining what they want.  
 Of course, the phenomenon of fictional incompleteness is ubiquitous, and by 
no means restricted to interactive fictions: Harry Potter and Bladerunner are just as 
incomplete as Dark Souls. So, if we are to make the case that there is a kind of 
fictional incompleteness that is distinctive of interactive fictions, we must established 
is that there is a further kind of fictional incompleteness, beyond the permissive and 
prohibitive cases, and that the presence of this kind of fictional incompleteness is the 
hallmark of interactive fictions. 
 
4. Works, Games, and Choices 
 
According to Walton, when we engage with representational artworks — “fictions”, 
in his sense — we engage in sophisticated games of make-believe, much like the 
games played during childhood (cops and robbers, bears, etc.). In light of our 
previous discussion, this analogy should not be too surprising, since our 
engagement with children’s games, like our engagement with fictions, is both 
imaginative, in the sense that playing the game involves imagining that certain things 
are the case, and structured, in the sense that there are oftentimes rules which 
determine what is to be imagined (e.g. the players of a game might be prescribed to 
imagine that x is dead if, in reality, x is lying motionless on the ground, or the 
players might be prescribed to imagine that x is a bear if, in reality, x is a tree stump). 
We devote much time and energy to playing such games of make-believe during our 
childhood years, and it would be surprising if the urge to engage in such games 
disappeared without a trace in adulthood (especially given the important roles that 
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such games play). According to Walton, this urge instead re-manifests itself in our 
engagement with fiction. 
However, in the case of fiction, there is a distinction between what is true in 
the work and what is true in the game of make-believe we play with that work. That is, 
there is a concept of fictionality defined in terms of the existence of prescriptions to 
imagine that is operative with respect to questions of what is true according to a 
given work. But there is another concept of fictionality connected to questions of 
what is true according to a given game of make-believe.11  
And it is crucial to see that there is no simple one-to-one correlation between 
works and their associated games. It is perfectly possible, e.g. that two people could 
read Harry Potter but play different games of make-believe as a result: Billy could 
play a game according to which Harry is an evil child and Alice could play a game 
according to which Harry is a good child. Then even though their games of make-
believe are tied to the same work of fiction, they are distinct insofar as they have 
different contents that are generated on the basis of different principles of 
generation. But not all games of make-believe are born equal: there is clearly some 
sense in which Billy is playing the wrong game and Alice is playing the right one. 
Or, to use the nomenclature that Walton introduces, Billy is playing a game that is 
authorized for Harry Potter, whereas Alice is playing a game that is unauthorized.  
 The distinction between what is true in a work of fiction and what is true in a 
game of make-believe has a special relevance in the context of fictional 
incompleteness. For suppose that Alice is not only playing a game in which Harry is 
good, but also one in which Harry has A+ blood. (For instance, suppose Alice has the 
bizarre belief that all good children have type A+ blood, and comes to imagine that 
Harry has A+ blood on the basis of imagining that Harry is a good child.) Then 
though it is neither true in the work nor false in the work that Harry has type A+ 
blood, it is still true in Alice’s game that Harry has A+ blood: it is something she 
should imagine on the basis of the principles of generation she accepts. And 
assuming that this is a case of permissive incompleteness, it follows that her game is 
authorised for Harry Potter even though there is something true in her game that is 
not true in the work that is Harry Potter.  
In cases of permissive incompleteness, then, it is allowed that a game of 
make-believe can be authorised even though it is more complete than the work: 
though p will be neither fictionally true nor fictionally false, we allow that p can be 
true in some authorised games and false in other authorised games.  
By contrast, in cases of prohibitive incompleteness, it is not only the work that 
is incomplete: since appreciators are prohibited for imagining one way or the other, 
there will be no authorised game in which p is true and no authorised game in which 
                                                 
11 Compare Walton’s (1978, pp.10-11) distinction between imaginary fictional truths and make-believe 
fictional truths. The relation between that distinction and the one drawn by Walton (1990) is 
somewhat unclear, and we will take the later as canonical.   
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not-p is true. So each individual game authorised for the work in question will be 
incomplete with respect to p. If Alice were to play a game in which she imagined 
that Deckhard was human or that he was not human (but rather a replicant), she 
would not be playing an authorized game, since, in both cases, there would be 
something that is true in her game that is not true in any game authorised for Blade 
Runner. 
With these distinctions in mind, we can finally turn to the kind of 
incompleteness found in Dark Souls — and by extension, other interactive fictions. In 
one sense, the incompleteness in Dark Souls is permissive in character: it may not be 
true in Dark Souls that the player character links the fire rather than lets it fade, but 
players are permitted to choose to link the fire, and permitted to choose to let the 
world fade to ash. However, in another sense, the incompleteness in Dark Souls is 
very different to the cases of permissive incompleteness that we have considered so 
far. One way to see this is to note that if the player character does not make a choice 
— perhaps when faced with the burden of deciding the fate of the Lordran, they just 
quit and play something less onerous — then there is a clear sense in which they 
stop engaging with the work. In other words, full appreciation of Dark Souls requires 
that the player resolves the incompleteness.12 Nothing like this is true of the cases of 
permissive incompleteness we have considered; in those, appreciators are allowed to 
resolve the incompleteness as they see fit, though the work does not force them to 
resolve the incompleteness. Hence, whilst the kind of incompleteness we find in 
Dark Souls is permissive in the sense that the player is permitted to resolve the work-
level incompleteness in a variety of ways, it differs from standard cases of 
permissive incompleteness by also being prescriptive, in the sense that the player is 
not only permitted but prescribed to resolve the incompleteness in some way 
(though there is no particular resolution that is so-prescribed).  
 The contrast between these cases can be precisely modelled within the 
Waltonian conception of fictionality. Whilst Alice is permitted to imagine that Harry 
has blood type A+ and permitted to imagine that Harry has some other blood type, 
she is not required to imagine one way or the other. That is, though there are 
authorised games in which Harry has blood type A+, and authorised games in which 
Harry has some other blood type, there are also authorised games that are 
incomplete with respect to Harry’s blood type (though it might be true in such 
games that he either does or doesn't have A+ blood). Meanwhile, though the player 
of Dark Souls is permitted to link the flame and permitted to let the fire fade, she is 
required to go one way or the other. That is, whilst there are games of make-believe 
that are authorised for Dark Souls in which the Chosen Undead (the player-character) 
                                                 
12 Note that if the player resolves the incompleteness by (say) linking the fire, it will no longer be 
permissible to imagine that the fire fades to ash. What is going on here is that the permission to 
imagine that p is co-ordinated with a conditional obligation: if the player chooses to link the fire 
rather than letting it fade to ash (as she is permitted to do), then she will be obliged to imagine that 
the fire gets linked and doesn't instead fade to ash.  
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links the flame and other authorised games in which the Chosen Undead lets the fire 
fade, there are no authorised games in which the Chosen Undead neither links the 
flame nor lets the fire fade. 
 Moreover, the kind of incompleteness found in Dark Souls and other 
interactive fictions differs from more familiar kinds of incompleteness in another 
way. For instance, in normal cases of permissive incompleteness, the appreciator 
may resolve the incompleteness simply by imagining one way rather than the other; 
it is true in Alice’s game that Ron has an even number of freckles simply because 
that is how Alice imagines Ron. But in the case of Dark Souls, resolving the 
incompleteness is accomplished by the player’s doing something more — i.e., 
inputting certain commands at the relevant point – which makes it true in her game 
that the fire is linked. In other words, it is not true in Isabel’s game that the fire is 
linked simply because that is what she imagines. Rather, it is true in her game that 
the fire is linked because she exploits the media-specific mechanisms (command 
inputs) that ensure that it is true in her game that the fire is linked.13 And note that it 
will be true in her game that the fire is linked even if she doesn't imagine it to be 
linked. If she inputs the relevant command and then becomes distracted by her cat, it 
will be nonetheless true in her game that the fire is linked even though she doesn't 
imagine it. The commands she inputs make it the case that linking the fire is the 
thing that is now prescribed to be imagined, whether or not she does indeed imagine 
that the fire is linked.  
In this sense, the kind of incompleteness found in Dark Souls differs from 
standard cases of incompleteness in two ways: (a) the appreciator is not only merely 
permitted, but in fact required to resolve the incompleteness, and (b) the specific 
mechanisms (i.e. media-specific principles of generation) by which the 
incompleteness is resolved are distinctive. 
 
§5. Interactivity as Incompleteness 
 
The form of incompleteness found in Dark Souls and other interactive fictions is an 
instance of forced choice incompleteness:  
 
Forced Choice Incompleteness 
A work is forced choice incomplete with respect to p just in case (a) there is 
no prescription to imagine p and no prescription to imagine not-p (i.e. p is 
neither fictionally true nor fictionally false) and (b) there is a prescription 
to either imagine p or imagine not-p  
 
                                                 
13 For different media, this will take different forms: for example, this will mostly involve the use of 
controllers in videogames, but will consist of turning to a specific page in the case of CYOA books. 
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Understanding the second clause is crucial here. To say that there is a prescription to 
either imagine p or imagine not-p is not to say that there is a prescription to imagine 
the disjunction, p or not-p. One does not comply with the prescription to either 
imagine p or imagine not-p by imagining a disjunction: one complies with it by 
imagining one of the disjuncts. And though there is no requirement to imagine one 
disjunct rather than the other, there is a requirement to either imagine one disjunct or 
to instead imagine the other. More generally, all cases of forced choice 
incompleteness will be cases of permissive incompleteness (since there cannot be a 
prescription of either imagine p or imagine not-p if there are prohibitions on 
imagining p and imagining not-p), though not all cases of permissive incompleteness 
will be cases of forced choice incompleteness (since it might be not only permitted to 
imagine p and permitted to imagine not-p but also permitted not to imagine p and 
permitted not to imagine not-p).  
 The concept of forced choice incompleteness, we submit, allows for the 
demarcation of a kind of incompleteness that sheds new light on our understanding 
of interactive fictions. In particular, it allows us to address the puzzling question of 
how we can reconcile the idea that interactive fictions leave certain questions about 
the fictional goings-on open, whilst at the same time allowing that, in a given 
interaction, the fictional goings-on are settled by the choices made by the appreciator. 
By holding that interactive fictions generate cases of forced choice fictional 
incompleteness, we can have our cake and eat it. Interactive fictions leave questions 
of fictionality open by generating cases of fictional incompleteness. And the fictional 
goings-on are settled by choices made by the appreciator because all games of make-
believe that are authorised for that work will resolve the target incompleteness in 
one way or the other. They are genuine cases of incompleteness since there is no 
prescription to imagine one way rather than the other, though, but since there is a 
prescription to imagine one way or the other, they also share a feature that is 
typically only found in cases of fictional completeness. That is, in cases of forced 
choice incompleteness, there is a prescription to imagine, though there is no 
particularly imagining that is so-prescribed.  
 Our proposal also gives a natural explication of the intuition that interactive 
fictions are distinctive insofar as their content is determined by the choices and 
decisions of appreciators in ways that go beyond what is found in traditional 
fictions, i.e. that interactive fictions leave things open and require appreciators to 
decide how things will turn out. In this way, it nicely extends and clarifies Lopes’ 
notion of (strong) interactivity by linking it to a developed notion of fictionality. 
And, as should be clear, what counts as interactive fictions in our sense isn’t 
just limited to videogames like Dark Souls: ‘Choose Your Own Adventure’ stories 
(tellingly also known as gamebooks) like Edward Packard’s The Cave of Time, instances 
of live-action and table-top role-playing games, like playings of Dungeons and 
Dragons and Gloomhaven, and “interactive movies” such as Kinoautomat in which 
readers/players/viewers are required to make choices that determine the fictional 
goings-on will also generate cases of forced choice incompleteness. However, the 
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kind of incompleteness we are propose to take as the hallmark of interactive fictions 
is plausibly not found in works of traditional, non-interactive fiction. In this way, it is 
distinctive of genuinely interactive fictions. 
 
6. Incompleteness and Genre Classification 
 
Before concluding, we would like to anticipate one objection that might be raised 
against us. Specifically, one might object that forced choice incompleteness is not 
distinctive of interactive fiction since it is found in a particular range of traditional 
fictions, viz. those that are incomplete with respect to matters of genre classification. 
There is a long-running critical dispute over the interpretation of William 
James’ The Turn of the Screw, which can be read either as a naturalistic tale of a 
governess who hallucinates spirits threatening her charges or as a supernatural story 
of a woman genuinely being haunted by malicious ghosts. Both readings seem to 
comport with the fictional goings on, though how we classify the story with respect 
to its genre greatly impacts what is and is not fictional. For example, if we take it to 
be a ghost story, then it is fictional that there are ghosts that the Governess sees, 
which will not be the case if we classify it differently. In this way, Turn of the Screw is 
genre incomplete in the sense that it is left open into which genre the work is to be 
classified.  
 This genre incompleteness entails that Turn is incomplete with respect to the 
proposition that there are ghosts: this proposition will be fictionalised if we read 
Turn as a ghost story, its negation being fictionalised if we read James’s work as a 
naturalistic story. As neither genre classification is prescribed, there is no 
prescription to imagine that there are ghosts, nor a prescription to imagine that there 
are no ghosts. Further, one might think that readers are not only permitted to read 
James’ work in either way, while also being required to read the work one way or 
the other, which entails that they are required to either (classify it as a ghost story 
and) imagine that there are ghosts or instead (classify it as a naturalistic tale and) 
imagine that there are no ghosts. And this looks problematic for our claim that 
forced choice incompleteness is characteristic of interactive fictions. For The Turn of 
the Screw, like other genre incomplete fictions, is intuitively a traditional and non-
interactive fiction. Consequently, our proposal appears to mistakenly classify some 
paradigmatically non-interactive fictions as interactive. 
 In response, first note that the availability of multiple interpretations only 
generates genuine fictional incompleteness if we assume that the interpretations 
(and the genre classifications on which they are based) are all equally legitimate. 
After all, that it is possible to (mis)read The Maltese Falcon as a ghost story doesn’t 
entail that it is incomplete with respect to ghosts; rather, such an interpretation is 
simply not authorised for the work. It is not implausible that The Turn of the Screw is 
similar: arguably James did not intend the work as anything other than a ghost story 
and, at least to the extent that authorial intention plays an important role in 
determining how a work should be understood and interpreted, that gives us a 
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reason to resist the claim that the work is incomplete with the respect to the 
existence of ghosts.  
 Moreover, it is not obvious that genre incompleteness entails forced choice 
incompleteness, since the fictional incompleteness generated by cases of genre 
incompleteness might naturally be classified in other ways. For instance, one of the 
main worries about simply classifying Turn as a ghost story and dismissing all other 
interpretations as illegitimate is that doing so seems to miss one of the most 
aesthetically interesting features of the work, viz. the way in which the work is 
elegantly ambiguous, poised between interpretations. Indeed, one might think that 
the kind of incompleteness generated by Turn is actually akin to that of Bladerunner: 
that is, rather than being prescribed to make a choice between two competing and 
mutually inconsistent options — i.e. a choice between playing a game which 
resolves the incompleteness one way or the other — fully appreciating the work 
requires not making a choice, and being in a state where one’s imaginative responses 
are carefully poised between the competing options. So understood, the 
incompleteness generated by The Turn of the Screw would be prohibitive rather than 
permissive, and thereby very different from the kind of incompleteness we have 
associated with interactive fictions.  
Similarly, the option of not resolving the incompleteness seems permitted by 
Turn. This means that the kind of fictional incompleteness generated by genre 
ambiguous works is not best understood terms of the binary choice of either 
classifying the story as an instance of one genre (ghost story) and thereby imagining 
p (that there are ghosts) or instead of classifying the story as an instance of another 
genre (naturalistic story) and thereby imagining not-p (that there are no ghosts). 
There is in fact a third option – which is certainly permitted and might even be 
prescribed – of letting one’s imaginings be poised between the two options by 
simply not imagining either way. In this way, the kind of fictional incompleteness 
generated by cases of genre incompleteness will be distinct from the kind of 
incompleteness that we have associated with interactive fictions, where full 
appreciation requires making a binary choice. 
 In sum: the present objection assumes that the kind of fictional 
incompleteness generated by cases of genre incompleteness is an example of forced 
choice incompleteness, where appreciators are required to make a binary choice 
between two competing genre classifications, and in turn between imagining one 
proposition or instead imagining its negation. Our reply is that the kind of fictional 
incompleteness generated by genre incompleteness is not best understood in this 
way, since it robs genre incomplete works of their most distinctive feature, viz. their 
inherent ambiguity.14 
                                                 
14 We would like to thank Amanda Cawston, Christian Folde, Stacie Friend, Aaron Meskin, Robbie 
Williams, the audience at the Just A Game? conference at the University of Kent, and the editors of this 
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